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AUstract:
This paper develops an empirical model of exchan~e rates in a target, zone. The disfribution of
c~xchange rate changes is conditionetl on a latent jump variable w~herc rhe probability. and size of a
jurnp var~~ over time as a 5mction of financial and macroeconomic cariables. ~b'hen t}iere is no jump,
the target. zone is cretlible ancl exchangc rate chan{;es are constrainerl tr, remain within the tarhet
zone band. The paper revisits the ernpirical e~.itlence from thr' Ettropnau ~Iouetar}~ System rcgarcl-
ing the couditional distribution of exchange rate chang~es, the credibilit,}~ of the system, ancl the size
of the forei;n exchange risk prernia. In contrast to somr previous findings, we conclucle that the
French Franc~Deutschemark rate exhibits considerable nonlinearities, realignments are somew~hat
predictable, and the credibility of the s~~stem tlid not increase substantiallc after 1987. n~Ioreover,
our rnodel implies that the foreign exchange risk premitmt becomes large cluring speciilative crises.
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~Iore t.hau 20 ~'ears after rhe breakdown of the Bretton ~~-ooels s}-stem, the cla~'-tu-~la~ belt:n iur oC
c~~change t'ates conrinues to puzzle borh tltP aca~lemic cumnumit~ ancl polic~ makers. Tho recrnr
currency crisos in the Europeau ~lunerar~~ S~'stem (E~IS) ancl the g}~rations of the ~en relati~'e tu
rhe ~lollar, supposrdk defcing fwulamentals, has hei;;htene~ concerns among polic~.-makers about
'~aberrant" exchange tate mo~emeuts. Lt fact, a rc~ceut I~IF-stucl~' calls for the reimposiriun of
managecl target zones umung the uta.jor curreucies. The~se cle~.elopments are likeh' to rene~~. interest
in the operation ofexchange rate tarSet. zonas. ~~~hat are the tly namics ofe~change rates and itdr~rt~st
rates r~.ithin t.arget. zones? To ~~~hat extent ha~~e capital controls contributed to sustaiuable tar~et
zoues ancl what tri~gers their breakelo~rn'? Are speculati~-e crises of the sort receutly encouutrred
},~, rl;,, E;~te pt.eelictab!e? t3e;ir.r.ing v:ith Ivugman (1~91). thE~re is a large theorc.ticai liirratnre on
target zones which has hacl limited empirical success when confronte~l with data from the E11S.
Iu t{tis paper. we propose an Ptnpirical moclel of exdtange rates that captures many salient
fcatures oftargct zones an~l allows sotne of the questions posed abo~.e to Le ailclresaed. In parricular.
onr nroclel of exchange rate changes acconmtoclates occasional .jumps of the t~-pe experienced in the
E:~1S. Cuuclitional on no ,jump occnrrin~, we model exchange rate changes as bein~ dra~~~n from
a truncated normal clistribution with time-~-ar~~ing moments, so thar there is zero probabilirc of
obser~~ing an exchange rate change which would take the exchange rate outside the target zone.
That is, we moclel the system as being pPrfectly credible ín the absense of jumps. Jumps can occur
within the existing target zone or, in the event, of a reali~nment, the exchang'e rate may mo~.e
outside the current band. The mean size and variance oE the jump, as well as its probabilin~ of
occurring, vary over time as a function of financial ancl macroeconomic variables.
~Ve focus on thrc:e empirical issues ~~.ithin our framework. First, our empirical mudel offers
a rich characterization of the (condit.ional) distribution of the exchange rate.t Krugman's (1991)
creQible target zone moclel predicts that the eschan~e rate will exhibit (1) a nonlinear form of inean
recersiou and (2) conditional ~~olatility rhat clepends on the posit.iun of the exchange rate relari~e
1to the tar~et zone bounilaries. ~1~hrreas these atrribut~~, ~lu uut -rrnt to hr ptesrut iu th~~ ~far.i. unr
tno~h~l ~~nahlos ru tu 61ter out r~zchange ra~e juutps h~dom rs,uninirr~ rhe~r rntpirirnl prr~licri~~i~.-
Our ~'olatilir~ strucrure is morr gcueral tliau tho crailibl~~-tar~r~t-zuue lirorariuo iu n~;u ~~a~~~. Fir~r,
iu acl~liriun to cleprn~iruce on the pusitiun oE the exchan~,i~ rare r~irl~in the h~uul. rr~~~ in~~urpurate
generalized autoregrPSSi~r condirional heterosceilasricit~ (G-',RCHI e~fhcts inrootu ~olatilit}' mu~h~l.
S~~cou~. rhe total conQitioual ~'olatilir~. of eschanqe rare chan;es xlso incorporatos rho pussibilir~ ol'
jumps. ~Ve refer to this component uf ~'olatilit~ as .ju~r~ip risA.
Saconcl, w'e provide au altrrnati~r measure of the crt.~ilibilir~ of a target zoue. ~~~~ ~lotiue a
target zone to be perfecth' cretlible if the probabilin oF the ezchan~c rare mo~ iun uut,icfr~ rl~e bau~l
is zero. Since we specif}~ the complete conditional ctistribution of eechange rate chan;;rs. ~re am ablc.
to directly compute this probabilit.~, couditional on a~-ailable inforrnation. The ~cork uf S~'ens~on
(1992a), pre~icting small currency risk prernia in target. zones, has praupted man}' aurhors tu rolr
on uncovererl interest rate paritc (UIRP) an~ interest ilifferentials to infer market expertat.ions of
the ezchan~e rate moving outsicle the band. ~t'e clo uot. to take this route hecauso e~'icleuce wi
UIRP is mixed (see Bossaerts aud Hillion, 1991).
Third, we examine t.he currenc}. risk premia impliecl bc our moelel, provicling an alternati~~e trsr
of the size of currency risk premia.
The remaincler of che paper is organized as follows. The following section orrtlines the empirical
model and its relationship to the current literature. Section 3 contains a discussion of estimation
issues. The fourih section reports the empirical results ane] examines the conelitional distribution
of exchange rates. `vi'e appl~. the moelel to the French Frauc~De~utschemark (FF~Dn~1) rata from
ïvlarch 1979 until .Jul}' 1993. During that periocl the FF and D~f were part of the Ei`IS. Si~ction
5 focusses on the credibiliq~ of the target zone. The sixth section ~liscusses implied currenc}' risk
premia ancl the final section conclucles.
The main results can be summarizecl as follows. In contrast to previous empirical work such
as Rose and S~'ensson (1995), ~~r fincl e~'idence of nonlincarities in the FF~D~I rare. ~~'e also
find significant G.aRCH effects an~ time-~'ar~'ing junip risk in the~ con~lirional ~'olatilit~ proce~ss.~~~hrreas tLe 195i-1991 pc~riuil is often nsod as an ~~zainple of a cretliblo target zone (n..g.. Ball au~l
I3omn. 1cJcJ~). w'e finil rrali~;um~~nt prubabiliries tu hi~ q~iirr substaurial durinK rhat p~~riuil. Tlu~ Enc~
rhat uo rralignmonts occur clurin:; a prriu~] ~lues nor impl} that rhe~re is no rrali~umeur risk iluriu~
that period. Our realignm~~ur probahilities do nor increase dramaricall~' aheacl of thc~ SepreruL~~r
c~u~renc~' crisis in 1992. bnt ~lo spike up beforc~ the rlii~ust 1993 crisis. ~Iureo~er. rish pr~~iuiums
rencl ro be large prior to reali~umrurs.
2 Motivation aiid Econoirletric 1~Tode1
2.1 Theoretical Target Zone i`Iodels
Thc~ t}~eoretical tar~;et zoue ]iterature builcls prinrarilv on che st,vlized continuous-time moclel of
iíruóruan (1991). The exchange rate, 5'~. is me~asurecl in domestic currency. per cmir uf for~~ign
currenc~' aucl is in logs. Alureu~~er the exchan~e rare deprnds on market funclamentals ancl the
expectecl ezchan~e rat~~ ss impliecl b~' the sitnple monerary mode~l of exchange rate cletr~rniinatiuri.
One fiindamental is assumed tu follow a Brownian motion ancl the other funclamental is controlle~
tu i:Pep the erchange rare within a pre-specificcl bancl. Tw-o important assumprions underlie the
uio~lel: the tar~et aone is perfectlp om~lihle and it is defended with marginal inLerventions only.
The F~rugman moelel has strong empirical implications for exchan~;e rates and interest rate
differentials which have bePn widely stutlied (see S~~ensson, 19916 ancl the survey in 5~'Pnsson,
19926). Of particular itrterest to us are the irnplications that the conclitional volat.ility of exchange
rate chan~es shoulcl be smaller near the edges of the banel ancl the e~change rate shoulcl clispla~- a
non-linear form of inean-re~'ersion, even though fundamentals aru~ Brownian motions.
Direct tests of the I~rugman model in Sinirh ancl Spencer (1991) ancl De Joug (199-1) ha~'e
dc~li~'ered clc~ar rejections of th~~ moclel. Li particular. the en~logenous nonlinearities are not sufficient
to explain all of t.he lPptokiu'tosis and ARCH c~ffects in thr dara. Scu'prisingh~, other stuclic~s sicli
as Rusc~ an~l S~'ensson (1995) and Fluo~l, Rose, an~l ~larhieson (1991) do nor cletect significnut
uonlinearirie~s in E~IS data. The hisror}' of repeared reali~nments an~ the preponderance of intra-
3tnarginal inten'entions in the E`IS. clescrihoil b~' Gia~'azzi auil Gio~'aunini (19501 auil orhrrs. :are
also inconsistrnt ~~;irh the I~ruqmau tnoilc~l.
Tt~u itnportant extensions of the basic Iírugtuau mu~lel ate the innuilncriou of reali;;mw~ur ri~l;
aucl intramar~inal inter~rntions. Bertula an~l Caballero (1992) inrro~luce a(fizo~lÍ pruftabifit~ of a
tle~.lluation ~~'hen the exchan~t~~ rate hits the npper bomtilarc. Bartolini anrl I3oiluar ( 19J?j shu~~
that this simple extension can generate realisric correlatious hett~'een eschan~e rates aml inrrrrst
rare clifferentials. Ball anil Roma (19tJ3) ancl Bertola aut) S~'enssou (1993) gcuerate roali~tuuonr;
t.hrough an ewogenous jump process with constant. inte.nsit~'.
To allow for inrramarginal intercentions, Delgado ancl Dumas (1991) and Lin~lebetg ancl Suclerlin~l
(1992) introcluce mean-recerting fundamentals ancl Lieetsma an~l ~'an cler Ploeg (199-1) stress tLr~
empirical importance of this extension. Le~~-is (1995) presents an alternati~e model ~~-ith sitnilar
implications, where the mean revetsion arises from occasional intervontions b~' the authorities n'heti
the exchange rate deviates from target levels.
Our empirical moclel is inspired by all of these exteusions to the Krugman model ancl is moro
general in several directions. This generalitc permits t.he deri~~ation of a detailed set of st,~ lize~l
facts, ~~~hich shoulcl prove useful for future t.heoretical wrork. In weighing the lack of theoretical un-
derpinnings, we note that. the monetary' exchange rate model H-as ~'irtually aban~oned on empirical
grotmds (see ~leese and Rogoff. 1983) before it was picked up b}' target zone theorists, mainh~ for
convenience. In the remaincler of this section, ~ti'e ~liscuss and moti~'ate the most. important features
of our model.
2.2 An Econometric Target Zone ~iodel
2.2.1 Incorporating Jumps
~Ve be;iu b~' moeleling exchange rates in a perfecth' creilible target zone, bnt also introelucc tlte
possibilit}- of occasional jumps t.hat ma~', or tna~' not, take. the exchauge rate outside the ban~. One
moti~'ation for inchuling the possibility of jumps is the~ ~~rork of Jorion (1988). w~ito found e~iclence ofjumps in Huatin~ eschatt;;e ratPS. Furthermore, in the E`15. ~liscouriuuiries in the bilateral exchanne
rate mac occur naturall~- for a m,imber of reasous. Fitsr. an~l uwsr ob~ iously. a n~aligtuu~~ur uf r h~~
E~[S tar~„et zone ma~' causo a jtunp iu tlte ezcltauge~ rart~ ancl is ine~-irable w'hen the ni~w au~l thi~
ohl target zoues elo uot o~crlap Secou~l. a jurnp in rh~, excttan~~~ rat~~ may occur wirhin rhr r,rrgrt
zone. For exantple, a ptouounced change in rhe fundamrnral ~~alue~ of a curronc~ can be can~eil
b~ aunouncetnPnts of changes in central bauk policy or by~ s~.ulilen speculati~~e attacks on a weak
curreuc~- If the bilateral rate in qnestion is iu the lo~~-er half of the bancl when the annuuucetuent
or attacl: occurs. tltere is room for a large auil sucl~!en drprc~ciation in the bilateral rate to he
accummoQated within the band.
The reasat we ilo not separately mo~el withiu-nc~-banil jumps aut] realignntent ,juntps is t hrc~o-
folcL First, both heclgers ancl speculaturs are concerne~l primarily with mo~~ements in exchauee~ rates
rather than mo~ements in the E~IS ceut.ral parit;v- Our moclel focuscs on the pretlict.abilirv uf alt
jumps rather than.just realignments, although we are able to separate~l~ examine the preclictabiliry
of reali~tuuents. Secontl, there are relativel~' few realignment jumps, so inclucliug within-the-han~l
jumps helps to identify. the ,jump paratueters. Finall}-, while the ]argest ,jumps in bilateral rares
are associateil with reali~nments, there arr many. wiThin-the-bancl jumps which are of the same
orcler of magnitutle as rhe reali;naient jumps. Table 1 documents the ten largest inereases ancl
the ten laroest ~ecreases in the FF~D~I rate ocer the sample perio~l. This period contains the six
realigntnents of the FF~D~I central parity- that. hace occurred since the inceptiou of the E~IS. ~t'hile
three of those realigntnents dri~-e the three laroest changes in the bilateral rate, the other three
realignmeuts elo not. rank in the top ten changes in the bilateral rate. That is, seceral w-ithin-the-
ban~l .jumps are lat'~er than se~~Pral rPalignntent .jumps. T~co of the within-the-ban~l ,jumps aPPear
to bc~ associated with speculati~.e attacks leading up to a realignntent. Over the sample perioel.
jumps in t.he bilatrral rate are more likeh~ to take the form of a depreciation of the Franc thau an
appreciarion of the Franc There are nine increases in the FF~D~I rate that are larger than thr
lar~;esr decre:~se in the FF~D`I rate.Table ] ahonr h~~ro
Forniall~', ~re scek to tnoclel the Qistribution of lo~ ch;ui~~~~ in ~~~ch.uig~~ rates, cunditiou~il ou
a~ailable infonnation. fjJSr~~r-i)- r~~here Ir-t denotr~s au infonuariun set. an~l ft~~~l ~louotos a
conditional tlensit~. ~Ce construct this comlitional elisrriburion 1~~ soparatel~ modelin;; (1) th~~
con~itional ~listribution in the absonce of jumps, and (21 juuips in the i~schaut;e rate. To this ~~u~.
w-e clefine au indicator ~'ariable:
1 if the exchange rate jumps at time t
Jc -
The conditional rlishibution of exchange rate changes can be Eactorecl as:
f(os~ilr-t) - f(~srll~-~,Jr - o)t'r(J~ - oll,-t) t f(~s~lrr-,,J~ - I)Pr(.~~ - II1~-t)- (I)
Note that in coutrast to Ball an~ Roma (1993), Bertola an~l Caballero (1092), an~l Bertola an~l
Svensson (1993), we allow for jumps, rather thau.jus-t realign.m.ents. Engel anrl Hakkio (1995) usr
a model that. is similar to ours, however they model Jr as a?~farko~' process an~ do not take the
presence of t.he band explicitly into account (see also A~'esani anel Gallo. 1996). Below, we clescribe
the precise specification of the component. pieces of our densitc and we summarize the full moclel
in Table 2. The precise definitions of t.he ~'ariables used in t.he rnodel are summarize~l in Table 3.
2.2.2 A 1~'Todel of a Credible Target Zone
First., consider f(.7.S~~Ir-t, J~ - 0), t.he distribntion of exchange rate changes conditional on a~-ail-
able iuformation, anrl on there beinK no jump. This corresponds to the setting of a proprrl~'
functioning targer zone s~stem ~chere the eschange rate ~rill neeer mocr outside the tart;er zone.
in which case exchange rare chan~es are bouneled. The maximum possible change. ~1t;, takes the
exchan~e rate to the upper boundan' of the t.arget zone, anel the mininnnn possible chan~e. .,~.
takes the exchange rate to the lowrr boun~ar.v. In such a s~'stem. a bormdecl elensir~. is requirc~cl ro
0 otherw'isenwrlel r~ebange rarc~ chan;es Lr rhis paprr. ~cr~ use a tnutratr~tl uurmal Qeusit}- ~~'hich has a
flesible fornr. fe~~ parametors ru rsrituart~. aurl is rl~~fin~~rl unl~ on (~i.~t~!.
TLo nrutcarerl uurnial ilisrrii~uríun is:
~ ~~,-r,,-, ~ t
- 0) - ~ ~ ~ ~,-~t ~~",-~
!~-~S'r~lr-t. Jr
I
~ ~ ~i~, -f~,-: ~ - ~ ~t.,- -i~,-i -, 1 ~
~ -. 1 ~' -~
~~hr~re O~') clenr.ires the staudar~ nonn~tl probabilit~ ~Irnsir~ fwrction anil ~h(.) represeuts rhr sratr
rlarrl nornral cumulati~e rlisrribution function anrl frr-t an~l ó~'-t are the cou~itional ruexu anil
cariance of the normal distributiou ri'hich is to be rruncate~. TI'rat is, ~Sr is mudelocl as b~~inr;
uonnall~ ~istributed ~t.inc ~onditional tnoan frr-t anrl ~ariauce cr~'-t, n'itlr an}' prubabilit~ n;.r.~s
Falit~g outsiilr~ the ranee of [~c,' -~c~~ beiu~ truncatcd ar,rl a~lu'ed ba~k itr prupur~iuu to the clensitc
~cirhin this range.
~Ve parameterize the conditional mean. ur-t. ro inrorporate mran re~~ersion b~ lett.iug exchan~F~,
rato changes cloponel on the position in tlre band: ~r-t - tiIs ~- i3~PBr-t, w'hrre PBr-t rarkes a
calue on [-1, 1~ indicating the relati~'e position of the exchange rate within the target zone. ~~'hen
PBr - 0. the eschange rate is at t.he center uf rhe target zone. when PBr - 1, the erchange~ rato-~
is at the upper boundary of the target zone, aud so on. Hence, rhe expected change towar~ the~~
center of the target zone is srronger ~~'hen the exchan~e rate is near the ed~~e of the bancl. This
is consistent with t.he prerlicrions of a Krugman-type model ancl also with t.hc presence of intra-
marginal intercentions. For ezample, central banks ma~' defenel an implicit ezchange rate target.
within the banrl. Althou~h there is no official record of such an implicit target for the French
Franc, narro~ver bantls u'ere maintainerl b~ both the Dutch ancl Bel~ian central banks for parts of
rhe sample perio~.
Thi~ conelitional variance, a~-t, fulluws a G.-~RCH ( 1.1) procrss.- au~tnentecl ro allo~~~ for rlepen-
ilence on thr position ~~'irhin the bau~] (~S'hich is rhe~ sole determin~uir of rhe conilirional ~'ariancr itra stantlard target zoue model):
Qi - dta f dn(f - RDr-t)F~'-t t 3t~a~' t t,it3~Pa~-t~. (`-')
In this specification. Ft - JS~ - E~-t[c~.S~). as is standarcl. antl RD~ is a re;rlignmenr tlunnn~~
variable which takes the calue 1 when a rralignment of thr target zone occurrc~cl iu ~ceek t an~l
zero otherwise. This variable is included to capture the Pffects of "pressure-relieving" sltucks. It
is cornmon in the E~1S for realignments to be preceedetl b~. periods uf above-a~~~rage ~ulatilit~,
often caused b~. speculative attacks antl fears of a sudden depreciation in the ~~alue of a currenc~.
The periotl immediately after a realignment is usuall~- characterized by below-a~.erage volarilit,~., as
the weak currencys competitive posit.ion has been restored, the exchange rate is usualh. near the
center of the band, and the probability of another realignment. in the near future is stuall. Sincc
realignments often cause a large one-time shock to the exchange rate, F~-t is lat'ge ancl a stamlard
GARCH moclel would predict ~.ery high volatilit~~ after a realignment - the opposite of wfrat, is
expected. ~ti'e therefore model realignment shocks as being non-persistent.
2.2.3 1~4odeling Jumps
Next, w~e cortsider the possibilit.}. that the exchange rate may jump, in which case the rele~ant piece
of the density is f(OSL~It-t, Jt - 1). Since t.here is no a priori reason to impose an upper or lower
limit on the magnitude of a jump, we model jumps in the exchange rate as being draw.n Erom a
normal distribution. ~i'e allow~ the moments of the ,jump distribution to be state-depenclent (i.e.
depentlent on It-t, the information set). The form of this state-tlependence rentlers the conditional
mean proportional to the con~litional stanclard deeiation. For ezample, if the contlitional mean of
the jump distribution is small and positi~-e we constrain the conditional variance to be stnall. TLis
assumption limits paratneter proliferation and avoids irlentification problems in situations where
a positi~e juntp is expected (the condit.ional mean jmnp sizP is positi~~e), while at the same time
there is a significant prubabilit~. of a negati~'e jump (the conditional cariance of the ,jump size islarge). In particttlar. tchen the eschange rate.jnutps. tce modol changes in eschan:tr rates I,SrI
as boing (coutlitionall~} uormalh tlistrilnue~l tvinc ~on~lirional mcan pt-t anil cor.~liriunal ~'arianc~~
, p~-tb" ~chere ó is a scaling paranterer to br estiutati~~- arn
~~-t - 3~ ~;3tLRr-t f 3s~P13t-tl t.jr,IDt-t f,j;C~ID~-t
These couilitioning variables, ~t'hich are eh~fiue~l preciseh' in Table 3, are:
1. Thc, clifference betw'een the le~el of French reserves an~l a moviug a~erage of pre~~ious resen'e
levels, LR~-t. :~lthough in the E~IS intervention is oul} manelatorc whrn the exchangc ratr
hits the bounclary' of the bancl, central banks that foresec~ spectilative pra~ssures. mi;;ht. an~l
do. intervene intramarginalh'.a Therefore, changes in the levei of reserves might. signal a higher
probabilit}' of either a realignment or a swift mo~'ement to the edge of the bancl. Specula-
tive attacks ma~' also drivc~ reser~'es to a critically low level beyontl which the targ;et zono
becctnes unaustainable and a realignment becomes iuevttable.`t ~~-e use the movin~; a~'erage
specification for tw.o reasons. First, the level of reserves is measureel H-ith error. By nteasuring
reserves relatice to a mot'ing average, we capture the elepletion of reserves that occurs tluring
a speculative crisis without regard to the level of mserves. Secoucl, it. is common for reserces
to be depleted quite dramaticallv in the month before t.he realignment (see Collins, 1992).
Therefore, e~amining reserves relative to a moving average is likely to provide a strong signal
of impending realignments.
2. The position of the exchange rate within the banel, ~P6t-t~. Larqer.jumps are expectecl near
the etlges of the band. At the lo~~'er bountlar~., a larger jump cau be accommodatecl wirhiu
thP bancl, and at the uppPr boundar}~, the onh~ kind of ,jump that. is possible is a realignment
jutnp, which tend to be relativeh~ large.
3. The interest ~lifferential with German interest rates. IDt-t. Speculatice tensions and thP
ensuing actions of monerar}' authorities to ilefend thP currene~' are reflected rapidlc in interesr
~~ratPS (se 5t'enssou. 19916). In particular. tlre ~'iehl cunr rvpicallv in~erts aurl the ~litfori.ntial
wirh the Grrman intatest rate increases ~chen a clr~aluation of the Freuch Franc is e~pccterl.
Bath the slope of the ~iehl cur~'e auc] short-term iuterrst rate ~litfemutinls can st~r'~'o as 1~~utP
preclictors, and thec are highh correlateel. In this mo~lel. we tr~' tu disentangle the size au~l
probabilitt. of.jumps which reyuiros that size aucl probabilit~~ tlo twt clepenil on the sanre set of
insrrumentc ~~~heu UIRP hohls. the interest race tliffr~rential equals expc~creel exchan;;e rate
chan~es raflecting both t6e expectecl size and probability. oE jumps. Empiricalh-, ho~ce~'c~r. the
slope of the ~-ield curve is a better jump predictor wl~tile the interest clifferential i~ a berrer
jump size inelicator (see below).
4. The cumulati~~e ittflation differPnt.ial between Gertnan}' aud France since thP mosr recetu
realignment„ CIDr-t. Larger ,jumps are expectecl when CID is lar~e. Since German~. has
consistently achie~ved lower inflation than most other )JIvIS comttries, an unchange~l E~[S-bau~l
graclualh~ erodes the competitiveness of these countries as their real exchang'e rates appreciate.
In the early years of the EMS, the realignments tppically restoretl comperitiveness. Frorn 1983
ouwarcls, however, realignments, although still highly correlated with cumulative inflation
clifferentials, no lon~er fully compensated for lost compet.itiveness so that inflationar~- policies
were punishetl (see Giavazzi ancl Pagano, 1988). Our model allows us to assess whether the
cutnulative inftation differential has any ex-ante bearing on the size of .jumps.
2.2.4 The conditioual probability of Jumps
The only piece of the model left to he speclfiP,(I is the t.ime-varying probabilit~- of a,jurnp. ac-t -
pt(.I~ - 1~1,-t). Since this is a true probabilit,v, we constrain 0 G ar-t c 1 using the normal
cumulative Sistribution function, as in a probit model. ~~'e Ic~~t the jump probability bn a function
of the slope of the yield cun'e, SYCt-t: ~i-t -~(,3t f Q2SY~Ce-1)~ It is likely that. the jump
probabilit}~ is infíuenceil by- a uumber of macroeconontic variables. ~Vithin the banfl, tnonetar~'
polic~~ has some independence of pursuiná other goals. ~i~herr macroeconomic tlevelopments, such
10a.; puur G`P-kro~.'th auil hi~h uui~mplo~'mcut. crrato tousiuus ber~~.oeu eschange rare ancl othi~r
ntacco-ecouomic guah. the,jmup ptubabilit~~ tuu~~ ti~is. Ilu~~r~~~r. rho telarionship hvncrctt rnactu-
ocuuomic itara arnl jutnp probahilirics is lik~~l~' tu hr uoi~~' auil ir is iliKiculr ru cousrr.rrr c,o~~klc
tnano-ecanomic ~lara that ~cere acrnallc iu the itiformatiun s-cts oF economic a;;r~ut~. ~rLF~ ;lupc
uf the ~ie]rl cur~'c, tluough the for~car~ luokiuó narurr of marl:er-tlctenuíueil iuteresr tatos. nra~~
brtrer refiect such offects thau pourl~ rni~astrreil tuacroocouumic ~lxta.
Of course, the ~'ariablrs thar determine the mean an~l ~'at~iauce uf the ltmtp. doscriberl aho~o.
tua~' also affect the jump probahilit~'. Ilu~~acer. ~tir fouu~l the~m to be statisticall~' an~l economicall}'
insit;nificant jumP Pt'eclictors iu the presence uf rhe slope of the }'iolcl cur~'e ~'ariable.~'
Tables 2 aurl 3 al~uut herc
3 Estimation
The moilel ~escribeil above is ~~rittrn in rerms of rhe cunilitiuual ~listrihutiou of exchan;c rati'
changes xncl is a reduced-form mudel. Full inforruation maximum likelihooil requires that w'e
model rhe ,joint densitt' of exchange ratn changes nnd the. comlitioning variable~s, which is be~'onrl
the scope of this paper. In empirical work in this area, it is customary to proca~ed by masimizin~
thc eonditi~o~ial likelihooil function ~~ -,G(C~Sr~lr-t). Wktile this approaeh produces consistent
estimates of the parameters of our model, some degree of efficiency is sacrificet) by' parameterizing
onl~' part. of the full likelihood function. To see t.his, ~lefine Zr to be a ~'ectur consistina of all of our
con~itiouing ~'ariables, and let Z~ -{Z~. Zi-t, ..., Zi}. Let [~Sr be ~efined in similar fashion. The
intormation set is made up of thPSe two components so that It -{~Sr. Zr }. Fiualh', clefine H to be
t.}te ~.ector of parameters affectin~ the ,joint ~listribution f(JSr, Zr)-
Full maximutu likelihoocl estimatiuu rFquires ma~imi-tation uf rhe likc~lihou~l function basecl on
the joint ilensit~~ of the clata anel the conrlirionin~ ~'ariablcs:
G(,~5~~. Zr: H) - ln ~Ï~~ST. Zr: B)~ .
(J)
11A serii~s oti courliriunin~ arguments cau I~~~ userl to esr,tbli~h that, up ro au initial comlition
ï(~s',~.z~:e)-rt,'-tliz,~~s,.h-,:eifi~s,lt~-t:~aj.
ConSítioning also on our j ump ~'ariable. J,. ~ ields
t
Í(~Sz'. Z~;9) - IIT t~ f(Zr~~Sr.Jr - t.7~-t:H).f~~Sr~J~ - i.h-t:9)Pr(Jr - t~Ir-tl.
,-o
~~'e then assume that once we conrlition on thP exchange rate, the conclitiouing ~ariables- arr iurle-
pPtirlent of the jump ~'ariable. That is
f(z,l~st.J~ - ,~,I,-,:e) -I(z,los,, h-t;H).
Clearlv, the conelitioning variablPS are not inrlepenclent. of the contemporaneous exchange rare
chanbes in our setting. For example, when ~S~ is large as a t'esult of a speculati~~e attack, it is
quite likeh' that LRr and S}'C~ will be low ancl ID~ will be hi;;h. The assumption rhat is marlr
above merely posits t.hat after conditioning on the change in exchange t'at.es, rhe ,jump ~'ariable
is not informative about the distribution of the conclitioning variables. That is, knowlerl;;e of
the actual change in exchange rates is at. least as informative as kuowing whether there was a
jump in exchange rates. If a large change in the exchanóe rate is observerl, it is nor possible to
dPtermine (ex post) ~rhether this was the result of a.jump or a draw frorn the tail of the no-jtmip
distribution. Therefore, the effect of this change in t.he exchange rate in the model is the same,
reáarrlless of the cause. Alternatiti~Plc, a realinnment. is obser~'able (ex post) since the change iu the
target zone botmrlaries ~~'ill appear in the ínformation set, anrl the d~~namics of the variables chant;~~
immediatel}' after a reali~nment. E~'en in this case, ho~cr~'er, conditionin~ on the jump ~.lriablr (Jt 1
is uninformati~'e when the chan~e in rxchange rate (JSr) anrl tar~'et zone bouudaries (C~t,-~ ) auil
(.~t,-t) are obser~~able. This is because ~~~hen ~1St mo~es the exchange rate uutsitle the existin~
12hnuil. i can oul~' br ~lur to a roali;;u:urur.`' T6i~ allo~~'s ns ro ~crirr tlir lo;;-likrlilioo~l functiou as
r ~'





~t hrrr 9i is thr ~'ector of pai.ltnrrrrs affrcriu~„ rhr con~lirional ~lisn~ibution of rxchan~r ratr ~~h~:n,~r;
an~l B~ is thr ~'ector of para:nr:rrs affrcti:?~ thr conditiuual ilisrribnriou of thr instrumr::r:- ~~'r
procre~l b~' purameterizinó onl~' rhe secon~ pirce of this lo;-lik~~lihood functiun. Siucr rl:i~ srcond
piecr allo~~'s itJrntificatiou of Bt. au maximum lik~~lil:ou~l estimates ~cil1 be consistent. ~~'hilr th~~ first
piece of t.he lo~likelihood functiou ma~' eontain putrntiall~' relecant information, parametrrization
uf rhis ,joiut ~lensit~. is not feasible ;i~rn thr unmbrr of con~lirionin;; ~'ariablr, an~1 the sizr of o~u
~lata set. Since consistrnt rstimates of all of our paramrters cau he obtaine~l b~' focusinn e~clusi~'rl~
ou the secoml piece, this is the procedure w'e rmplo~~.
4 R~sults
4.1 Data
Our ~lxta were obtaineil 6~om Datastrearn., Tiae Finan.c~ial Tirnes, an~l thr Inrrrnational ~louetary'
Fund publications E.cchange .Arrnrzge~n.ents an~l Intern.atrona( Fi~ncenc~~ral S'iatist:~av. The samplr
consists of ~~'rE'~klv data from Tlarch 19ï3, ~~'ith the start of the Exchange Ratr Mechanism (ERDI}
withín the E~IS, throu~h to Jul~. 199:3, a total of ï~~3 obser~'ations. We usr Euro-currenc~' interesr
catrs in the empirical analysis because the~~ are trnr market-clrtermined ratPS. The presence of
capital controls in France, for most of the sample prriod, implies that there can be a significant
~~~erlge bPtween clomestic rates anel true markrt ratrs.
Figu:r 1 plots the FF~D~I ezchangr rate ancl E`IS bouncls oarr the sample prrioil. Figure 2
contains time-serirs ~raphs of the kr~' cariables in the mo~els - the position in thr banel, thr relati~'r
lr~irl of reser~'os of thr IIanqur ile Francr, thr slopr oE rhr }'irhl cur~'r. the intrrest diffrrential. and
thr crma.:latice inflation differeutial.
1:;Fi~urPS I? abuur hrrP
4.2 Results
The ecouometric rnoclPl in TablP 2 w'as Pstimated b~' maximwu IikPlihoo~l nsin~ tltP GAUSS ~L1~-
LIIi and C~IL mo~lules. The paramerer estimates rPportPCl ha~'P bePn ~Prihed b~' usin~ two op-
timization al;orit6ms (BPrnclt, Hall, Hall, ancl Hausutan ancl Bro~'clPn. FlPtchPr. Golclfarb, au~l
Shanno), anel se~'eral different sPts of startin~ ~'alues- ~Vhilo thP likelihoo~l fituctiuns are uouliu~~su
and mav aclmit. sPVPraI local optima, this procPdure provides some dPgree of conficlence rhar rhe
parametcr estimates reportPd bPlow- atP at the ~lobal maximum. In all casPS. as~'mptotic stanclar~l
PLTOI'S arP het.eroskeclasticite-consistent. ~~'e also repot-t results for a moelPl in which wP usP normal
clistributions for both Jc - 1 (jutnps) and Jc - 0(no jumps) (?`Iodel 2). ~1'e only nsP this moclPl
ro provicle for a comparison with standard models, which ignore the possibilit~' of jumps anil arP
based on a single couditionallv normal distribution.
ThP parameter Pstimates are reported in Tab1P 4. The model confirms much of the int.uitiou
re~'iewPd aboce, with most parameters takin~ the hypothesized sign ancl six reachiné sratistical
significance. In Table 5, we report a nurnber of likelihood ratio tests of restricted moclPls which arP
discussed bPlow.
Tables 4 and 5 about here
4.2.1 Mean Reversion Within tlte Band
Li our truncated normal model. the mean-reversion paramPter ~g is negative, but not sratisticall~'
significant according to thP t-tPSt or the LRT. In the truncatecl normal distribution, howe~-Pr,
!~e-t -!ja t ÍjsPBr-t represents the conclitional mPau of the unrlPrl~'inK nonual distribution which
is truncatsel, anel not thP conditiatal meau of the resulting truncatecl taistribution. ~Cheu thP
Pxchange rate is near thP top of rhP banel, the right half of the distriburion is truncatPCl morP
sP~'Preh' than the IPft, leavin;; a nPoati~Plc skewPd ilistribution. ~~'hereas ~c-1, clPfined abo~'P,
1I~(rnutes th~~ prak uf rhis ~listrihnriun. the moan uf rlir i!istrilnirion ~~ill be lu~~.er. furrLer ro~carcls
tli~~ reuti~r uf tln~ han~l. S~i:nii~~nic.~llc. ~cl:~~u rfn~ ~e:clian,~e r;irr i- n~~ar tór lu,~:~~t Ln~in~I,u~. rh~'
Ioft luilf uf tlu, ~lisrrif~nr,uii ~~:ill I~r niu:e se~t~trlr' tumi~,uecl. resultiug in pu,iricc -,ke~~'nrss- ~lute
tunuall~. rhr cuu~liiiowrl ~u~~~ui of rlu~ rruncarecf clisrribiirion is:
G~~S,~l,-i..ir - Ili - !rr-t f
~l~ l
-~-r~,.~~ ~~~.-,-~~~-~~
~-i - ~ o,-i
or-t.
- -t~~-i j - ~j~ Í -~r-,-i-r.--: ~1
,-~ J ` ~,-~ J
(S1
Fi;;ure 3 plurs rhis couilitiunal exp~~ctatiuu For earL ol~so.r~.ation in the sample, orclere~cl b}' thr
pusitiun of rhe o~chan;;e rare ~cirhiu nc~ tat;;i,r zuue, at rhe unconclitional ~~lriauce. The ru~~;iu
re~rrsion is e~'ideut frum the fact that ~chen the exchauge tate is clo~e to the honnclaries, u~o~rments
uf o~~er Q.5`~i~ are expected. An espocted ou~~-week clian~e in excLanKe ratrs nf this rnaguitucle
is cle~nrl}~ of r~couornic si~niticauce. Tu curnpute conficlence ban~ls, we generatr 1000 samples of
paranreter ~.alues from the multieariate as~~mpt.oric elistribution o[ parameters. For each Qatn
puiut, ~ce recompute the e~pected chau;;o in exchango rates (the mean re~etsirni) for eacL set of
parauteters, ~-ielcling 1000 estimates of the expectecl chan~e in exchan~e rates. The conficlence
hnuds are thrn taken as rhe Sth and 95th percentilc of tLe 1000 estimates. Clearl~ tlre conficlence
har.els are quire tight, indicating that the metui re~-ersion is also of statisrical si;nificance.
These results are consistent with intramarginal ceutral bank intervention, ancl are inconsistont
r~irh the regulatecl Brownian niotion assumption of the stanelarcl Kru~man moclel where inter-
ceutions occru unly at the eclges of the banil.' ~e~~ertheless, the non-linear nature of the mean
reversiun is broacll~~ cunsisrent. u.irh the pre~lictions uf Krugman-tt~pe models. Svensson (1rJ92b)
reporrs e~.iilence inconsisteut wirh this pretliction of man~~ thc~oretical CargPt. zonc models b~- ex-
amiuiu~ the relationship between the interest cliHerential an~l rhe position of tlte exchauge rate
~~itkriu rhe Lauel. This e~iclence, ho~~e~rr, clepencls ou t~~.o auxillary assrmtptions not irnpose~l on
uur mu~lel: nnco~'errcl interest ratr pïtrit}' and a full~~ creclible targer zone. `ote alsu, that. in `lorlel
2~~hi,re ~cirhie-the-ban~l changes are mocleled as bein~ norrnalh~ clistribute~, d~ is significantli. Irss
15than zero. indicating strong mean re~ersion.
Fi~ure 3 about h~~re
~1.2.2 Conditional Heteroscedasticity
In contrast to t.he predictions of Iirugman-tcpe moclels, ~~'e find that the conditional ~~olatilitc of
exchange rates does not decrease as the exchange rate approaches the bouu~aries of the taiget zone~.
Our maximum likelihood estimates of ~313 are positive and although the t-statistic ~loes not reach
significance, the more powerful LRT does indicat.e a significant. increase in volat.ilit~~ as the band is
approached. Ivloreover, there are also highh. significant GARCH effects which is also inconsisteut
wit.h the assumption of regulated Brownian motion in Krugman-type motlels. Q1i and r3t2 ai'e
individually significant according to the t-tests in Table 4 and jointly significant according to the
LRT in Table 5. Not surprisingly, the LRT for the .joint. significance of both sources of conclitional
het.eroscedasticity indicates strong significance.
Furthermore, the persistence of conditional variance shocks has been reduced b,~. the intro~luct.ion
of jumps and depen~lence on the position of the exchange rate in the band, and by modeling
realignment shocks as being non-persistent. In our model, the effects of conditional variance shocks
die out relatively quickly, with (31t -I-Qiz - 0.64ï1. Contrast this with (I) a standard GARCH (l,l)
moolel where a~ - Qro tQriEi-i }Q12a~-i and (2) an augmented GARCH model which is a no-.jump
version of A7oclel 2(i.e. ar - 0 Ht) where o~ -(3to f,t3it(1 - RDr-1)F~-i ~-Qi2ai-t f Qta~PBr-t~. Iir
the standard GARCH model (31t t Qt2 - 0.9~7~ and in t.he augmented GARCH model ,3i1 -i- Qi2 -
1.0244, although the hypothesis that Qll f Qt2 - 1 cannot be re.jected by a likelihood ratio test, at
the SQIo level of significance. Consistent with the work of Cai (1994) and Gray (1996a), allowing for
jumps has clramatically decreased the, persistence of shocks t.o exchange rates.g
16-1.2.3 .lutups
~esr, wo turn to the impact of jiunps un th~~ coneliriuual ~liarributiou of czchuuge~ rates. C?ufoini-
uatelv. it is diffictilt to trst fur ih~~ abseuce of.jnutps. since wid~~r the null tho parameters go~'ertting
the.jump at'e not ielentitiecl (see Hansen, 199'? fbr a ~leraile~l discussion). In Table 5. the LRT staris-
tic comparing oiir motlel wirh the nesteil no-jtmrp mu~le,l (~~ - 0 Ht), calculatecl iu t.he stan~arcl
manner. is 6~6.4031 which is esceptionall~' ]at;;e b~' an}' benchmark Despite the fact that we hat~e
not ad,justecl the X~ ~listribution of tliis LRT statistic to reflect tlre presence of parameters which
are not i~lentified uncler the null, ~i'e clo gain some clegree of coufidence in the statistical significance
of jumps from 1Lis ezercise.
~Ve can, huwever, formally test whether the jump probability is state-dependent or constanr.
Tite ,jump prubabiiit,v (a~) is m-gatitirly~ relatecl to tht~ slope of the y~i~-i~1 ew~~e in Ftance (3.~ G 0)
- when the vielcl curve inverts, the jump probability increases. Althuugh the coefFicient is not
statist.ically signifieant. (via the~ t-test in Table d or the LRT in Table 5), it is economieally. siguificanr.
~~'hat matters is the abilit~~ of the slopi~ of the pirlel ciu'~e tu predict large movements in exchange
rates. For t.he tnajorit~' of our sample, the jump probabilit,y cloes not show tnuch variation, but.
spikes occur when speculative crises are expect.ecl. Hence, the identification of the cuefficient comes
primaril~~ frorn those few observations where the yielcl curve experiences dramatic changes during
speculative crises. Such a pat.t.ern can be captured by our model since the derivative of the ,jump
probabilit~- with respect to the slope of the ~.ielcl curve is steeph' decreasing in its magnitude. Figure
4 graphs this derivative as a function of the level ofthe slope of the yielcl cur~~e. ~Vhen the y.ielcl curve
is upwarcl sloping, a 10`~~o drop in the slope raises the jump probabilit~' by less than 0.025, but. when
the vielcl curve inverts the sensiti~.itp to slope changes rises dramaticalty. Figure 5 plots the.jump
probabili;.ies which increase noticeablc, prior to most rc~alignments. The jump probability increases
at other times to reflect the probability of non-realignment .jumps. Ouce again, conficlence bancls
are computed by' generating 1000 samples of paz'ameter values from the multivariate as~~ntptotic
distribution of parameters. For each data point., the jurnp probabilitc is recotnputed for each set of
17paratneters. ~ieliliuK 1000 estituxtes of the,Írunp probal~ilin fur each obsercuriou. The cuufi~lr~w~r~
banrls are thru takr~u as tbe, Srh an~l rJ.irh pr~rcr~tttile of rhr, lllO0 e~tiutates.
Fi~nres -! an~ :i aboitt herr
The expectecl size of a jtnnp. couelitional ott one occurriu;;. (P,-,) also ~~ariE~s substautiall~
o~~er time. A larger .jump is especte~l ~cben the le~rl of reser~es runs lot~- (:it G 0). ~~lu~n tho
French interest rate cliffereutial ~cith Gerntan~~ increases (,3~ ~ O) an~ ~chen the cntuulati~e inHatiuu
clifferential betw-een the two countries is high (3~ ~ O). This inrlicates that ~~-eak-currenc~~ couutrir~s
havr their cumpetitive position restorecl, at least partialh~. by rcaligntueuts. Although the coefíicient
is not statistically significant, it is large in an economic sense. The effect of t.lte posiriou in tlte
bancl on the expectecl .jump size is not statisticall}~ significant. The tíme-variation in the expe~cterl
jumP stze (pt) is plottei] in Figure 6. Here the moclel inclicates that. t.he size ofjuutps is pri~elictablo.
The Pxpectecl mean .jump size increases noticabl~- bPfore the three latge traligument juntps in the
c~arly~ 1950's ancl non-realignment ,jumps are espectetl to be of relativelv smaller magnitnclc, ~~~hich
is also consistent. with the obserced data. Also, there is considerable mo~.emetu in the conFi~ence
ban~s, consiste~nt ~aith significant time-cariation in the jump siae, which is coufirmed b}- the.joiut
si~nihcance of the conditioning variables, accordin~ to the LRT reporteil in Table 5.
Figure 6 about here
Finalh~, we consider the impact. of.jumps on exchan~e rate ~~olatiliry by introclucing two measures
of ,jump risk. First, note that the condirioual ~-ariance of exchan;e rate changes can be ~~-ritten as:
h.r-, - VAR~~Sr~rr-I~ - ~(f - ~r-t)ai ~- ~r-tPi-,h~-t] -t- (f - ~r-t)~r-t[{ir-i - nr-tl'. (`~)
That is, jump risk consists of a ~-ariance term. ar-,p~-ió~'-,, which is ~irecth iucreasing iu 1r-t
anel pr-,, an~l a conilitiuual mean term. Since pr-, can be significantl}' greater than ~r-t, thr~ lattr~r
1Scan bi~ r~uir,~ importanr. ~l'r rouipnr~~ n~:o nu~asurt~s of rh~~ rrlati~r imporrance of,jiimp risk:





From tht~ results repoirerl in "Iabh~ 1. VR., is high ~rh~~n rhe ,uean .jump size is lii~hcr ttian rhe
espectt~d exchange rate rhan;;e ~cithin tLe bau~l. ~aturally. tlie ratio p~~aks b~~fure realiónments but
ir~ nel~er exceeils 25~:. VR~ ad~s a term that is incrc~usin~ in the variance ancl probabilitr of ajiunp.
Interestir,e;~, ,just before real;gnments ~~irtnally all of tlie rxchanne rate's conuitioual ~'oiarility- is
accounte~l for bp,jumps. E~~e~n in quiet periods, a significant portion of thi~ total contlitional volatility
can be attributed to jump risk, in fact tlie sauiple mean of VR1 is 0.62. Nots tkiat .jump risk was
still substantial after 193~, a peiioS of~en describecl e~ the most stable an~ creelible perio~l in E~IS
historv. ~~'e cliscuss the credibilit~~ issuc~ in more detail belo~~..
4.3 Diagnostic Tests
Finall}', a series of ~iagnostic tests are perfonned in order t.o establish that the proposetl model
provides a re~asonable description of the data. In particular. ~i'e compare the raw data, scalecl to




~cith the stamlar~lized resi~inals
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1~,These series are contrastecl iu Figure i. ~~-hrroas the~ raw. data cuntaius mau~' outliors, tlte ~uagni-
ru~le aml frequenc~~ of ontliers is much luwf~r for the srauclarclize~l resiclnals. Cousistrnt with this.
the kwtosis of the raw~ ~lata is G~.G1 w'horeas for rlie stan~arilizeil resiclnals it is oul~ 1'?.36. ~tore-
o~-er, rhe con~litional heteroskeclasticir~. rhat is e~.iclent in the ra~~- elata appoars to be w.rll-captnre~l
b~ the moclPl. The p-~~alues for the Ljung-Box statistics for serial correlatiun in the absolure ~-alu~~
of the raw data are 0.0330, 0.0030, 0.008-I. 0.0135. an~l 0.0280 for the firsr fi~r lags. in~liratin~
significant serial correlation. For the stanclardizecl resicluals the corresponcling p-~alue~ are U.5930.
0.8399, 0.8012, 0.8527, and 0.683-I. iudicating that the autoregressive colatilit~ is well captrueel b~.
the moclel.
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5 The Credibility of Target Zones
5.1 Credibility and Realignrnent Probabilities
Several authors ha~.e studied the credibilitc of the E~IS. Rose and S~-ensson (1993, 1995), Frankel
and Phillips (1992) ancl Chen and Giovannini (1992) rely on (1) uncocered interest rare parit}~
and (2) an estimate of the expected exchange rate change within the band, to infer realignment
expectat.ions. The consensus in the literature seems to be that the EDIS was essentiallv credible
from 1987 to 1991 - a period that contains no realignments. Consequently, the crises in September
1992 following the signing of the ~Iaastricht Treaty in December 1991, and the eventual breakdown
of the system came as a surprise. In this section, we examine whether our model implies a similar
increase in credibilitv after 198ï.
Recall that we ~efine a target zone to be "perfectl~~ credibile" if there is zero probabilirc that.
it will be realignecl. Let, p~-t ~lenore the realignment probabilit~~ at. time t-1 which is Pr[Si 7
ln(U~-t)IIr-t]. This is the probabilit~., conclitional on a~-ailable information. that the exchange
rarr will move aho~.e the upper boundarc of the target. zone. SincP our model full}~ specifies the
conditional distriburion of the Pxchange ratP, we can easil~~ compute this comlitional prohabilit~.
?0Interrsrinnl~. tutliko tho papers listr'il abo~r. we can also rfiseutan~lr' the nragnitude and ptub~tUilir~
oE a reali~muent. For o~ample. ~w can compiitr rhe piobabilitc that next ~~-~'ok's eschan;~' t.~rr~ ~~ ill
be ~`.~ abo~'e fhr curreut nppor baud.
The reali~nmeut probabilities. pr-i. at~e plotte~l in Fi;;ure 8. The realiónment probabilit~ spikes
uoticeabl~- before all sis reali~untents. Intere5rin'~h'. the mean realigument probabilit~- appears to
bP hi~her in the period since 1938- ~~~r' iutetpret this as e~ idence of the prPdictabilit~ uf the e~entnal
break~o~t-n oE the s~-stem. That is, in the pust-1988 period, conditions ~~'bich woulrl pre~ iousl~' ha~~e
causecl a realignntent, caused no change to the s~stem. This resulted in a sustained builel up of
realignment pcessitre. ~~'hen no pressure-relie~'ing rF'aliguments ~~'ere forthcoming, the entire s~~stem
P~.eutuall~ broke clow~n. The confidence bancls are relari~~el~~ tinht arouml the realignment proba-
bilitv anci var) consiclerab;~; o~~er time, consisient wirh si~nificant time-~'ariation in the couclirional
probability of a realignment.
Fi;;~ire 8 abont here
The tw-o poteutial criticisms of this argtmient, are addressed in turn below. First, our ana]}-sis
is w'ithin-satuple and the apparent realigrnnent predictabilit~. is- potantiallp spurious. In the next
sub-section. w'e conduct a true out-of-sample anal}~sis of the preelictive power of thc' model. Seconcl.
structural changes, including changes in capital controls anQ the signing of the Dlaastrichr Treat;v,
mav ha~~e affected the structural parameters of the unspecifieel underlping modeL Therefore, our
reduced form paramerPr estimates ma}- be unstable.
5,2 Predictability of Realignments
Although the variables that we use in predictiug realignments have bren usecl bPfore. w-e argue that
our anal~'sis does not amount to data-snooping because most previous work has not founel e~~idence
that these variables hold an~' predictice pow'er. `Ioreo~er. we are also carefiil to alla}' concerns abour
sowe form of "tnodel-snoopin~'. That, is, the model specifiecl in equation (3) relies on a rhoron~h
aual~sis of how- the E`IS operarPd durin~ the sample period. In 1979. it is unlikel}~ that sonteborl~'
21couLl ha~'o furnutlated such a moclel. For Pxmnple. the E~IS Itael a uuntber of m~~chauisms (such as
the di~ergence in~icator) dc~siguE~d ro make it a s~~mmetric sstrnt. rather thau thr D~I-auchorecl
scstem that it e~'entuall~ became. Cousequenrl~, wr attompt to coustruct a series of true es-ante
realignment probabilities, noting that our econoutetric tnude~l coulcl onl~' ha~-e bi'en formulatecl after
a number of realignments hacl occurrecl, clarif~'ino the role of the D~I. the effect of speculati~'e crises
ai interest rates, and the importance of real exchange rate changes. Therefore, w'e use clata from
19ï9 to 1983 (t.he first 199 obser~'at.ions) anel focus on the preclicti~e pow'er of the model for further
realignments (t.he remaining 550 obser~'ations). To do so, w'e re-est.imate the moclel e~~er}' week
adcling new observations and use t.hese parameters to compute the realignmcnt probabilit~- one
week aheacl, conclitional ou obser~'able informat.ion. These probabilities are plottet] in Figure 9.
The annualized root mean square error (Rn1SE) from using our model to predict the exchange
rat.e one week ahead is 15.5oIo compared to 16.2`1o and 16.Solc for the R~1SE of a simple ranSom walk
model E[Srtt~lr] - Sr. and the unbiasedness moclel E(Sr~t~lr] - Sc f(zif - xi")~52, respectively.
Whereas t.his improvement in out-of-sample fit. ma~- be small, :~[eese ancl Rogoff (1983) note that.
most empirical and struct,ural exchange rate models fail to beat. the random walk mocleL Moreover,
we repeated this experiment using a more parsimonious model with ~3s -~~ -~~ - Qla - 0 This
model yields a R'`1SE of 15.14`7c. Finally, the annualized RIt1SE of the 36 largest exchange rat,e
changes (5io of t.he sample) are 53.2"10, 53.Oolo, and 47.3`io for the random walk, unbiaseclness model,
and our model, respectiveh'. We draw some comfort from these results since a reliable forecast of
the largest. exchange rate rate changes is part.icularly important. for most market participants.
Figure 9 about hcre
5.3 Credibility and Structural Changes
Controls on inkernational capital flow-s can protect. elomestic interest rates from the latge ftuctua-
tions associatecl with expectations of exchange rate realignments. ~Ioreover, a central bank ma~'
experience large losses of reser~'es when hoiders of domestic high-powered mone~- sell the clomestic
2~currPnct~ to the mntral bank in r~chan;;r for forPi~u currrnc~~ jusr brforr a rle~~aluation is exprctecl.
To sonir. capiral conrrols ~crrr an rssrnrial in~rr~lirnt of the stabilit~- of thr E~IS (seo. for rxantplo.
thr fauioiis Padoa-Schioppa rrpurr of 19851. ro othrrs. cnpiral controls pre~~rntrcl optimal allocariou
of rrsonrces ancl ma} ha~e been lar~eh- circuun-entril an}~~.1~~.
Frauce has a lun~ histotT of capital conraols, but rhe}~ ~~-ere g,raduall~~ rolaxe~ ilurin~ our samplr
period. rsprciall~' afrrr 1986.s If changes in capita( ronrrols affrcrrrl thr cretlibilir}~ of the s}~strm.
rhf ir effects ~i~oulcl br most ~ isible in rhr parametrrs go~.ernin~ the síze ancl probabilit~ of a jump.
Unfortunatel~., this mal:rs it ~-irtually impossible to constauct meaningful tests for structural change.
Sincr rnost changrs occurrecl after 1985, bur no ma.jor reali~nmrnts oecurrecl cluring this prriocl. it
is impossible to iclentif~. the jnmp parametrrs using onl}- post-1985 data. ~~'hen estimarin~ reali~n-
ment probabilities using only post-1985 data, one is bound to find low realignment probabilitie~s.
Ho~~-e~~er, although no ma,jor rralignments occurred, this need not. mran agents dirl not esprcr
thrm. That is, the post-1985 data potentiall}~ suffer from a classic peso problrm. Consequenrl~, it
is critical to use the rarly, more turbulent, periorl to estimate the ,jnmp parameters.
Although tlris pre~~ents us from conductin~ formal econometric tests, we catt use Figure 9 to
sturlv the behavior of the out-of-sarnple realignment. probabilities arormd the dates of potenrial
strnctural changes. The first issue is whrrher t.he relaxatiou of capital conttuls alfecteel the credibil-
it~~ of the s~~stem. blanv doubted the sustainability of the E:~'IS in light of the clzusic argument. of
the impossibilit}. oE pursuing an indrpendent monetary policy in a st~stem of fixed eschanoe rates
and perfect capital rnobilit~-, However, most empirical studies find that the credibilit~~ of the E~IS
increased considerabl.y after 1987 (see Franl:el anel Phillips, 1992, Chen and Giovannini. 1992. aucl
Rose and S~~ensson. 1993). Hence, these studies suggest that capital controls are not a necessar}-
conilition for a credible E~IS. The currency crises in 1992, however, anrl the ensuing reimposition
of capital controls b~~ Spain, casts doubt on this conclusion.lc Our results ha~~e somet~.hat ~lifferrnt
implicatiens. As Fi~ure 9 sho~cs. reali~nment probabilities remain hi~h after 1987 and there is no
doti.mvard trend. This is all the more surprisin„ since inHation differentials, one of the underl}.ing
macroeconomic causes of tensions. had substantially narrot~~ecl ot-er time Interestingh. one prriod
?;;of relati~'e turbulence occurs shorth' afrer rhe June 1988 EC decisiou to trmo~'e all capiral conrrols
in the E~[S. This indicates that rhe post-1~6~ perio~l iua~. ha~'e been les, stablo than pre~iou~I~
thoughr.
The srcond issue is the impact on credibilitp. of rhe ~Iaastricht Treat~~, which laid our rhe process
for economic and monetat.~' union (E`IU). R-hile there is an extensit'e debate about the costs and
beneftts of E`IU, tho yuestion is ultimateh' an empirical one. Li the context of our model, iE t6e
`faastricht Treat,~. was Full}' credihle, the realigivnent probabilit}' should ha~.e decrPasPCI aftor (or
e~~en before) the Treaty was signed.
Figure 9 sho~~s that. there is a clear increase in realignment probabilities in No~'ember 1991.
which is reversed b~~ January 1992. This ma~. reflect the speculation of market. pazticipants abont
the possibility of one last realignment before the process totvards Ek1U was started. or general
uncertaint~. about the feasibilitr- of the Treaty. In fact, after German reunification in 1990 manv
economists argued that a revaluation of the DM was warranted ancl that failure to do so ma~- put
srrains on tlte movement towards Ei~IU. In contrast to previous st.udies (see especiall~' R.ose and
S~~ensson. 1993), wr find eridence of such strains. For example, after the fall of the Berlin Wall
in November 1989 and the December 1989 Strasbourg Summit, in which a date for the ~taastricht
Conference was agreed upon, realignment. probabilities increased significantly reaching 5.So7o at
}'ear-end.
The currency crises have been the subject of even more debate, particularly the September
1992 crisis which ]ed to both the British pound and Italian lira exiting the system. R'as the crisis
anticipated by the markets? It is interesting to re-examine this question in the context of our
model, since Rose and Svensson (1993) and Rose (1993) ha~.e concluded from a quite diHerent
framework that the currency crisis in September 1992 came as a surprise to market participants
and governntents alike.~~
Surprisingly, there is no increase in realignment probabilities during 1992 and our model does
not show an~- effect of the re,jection of the ~Iaastricht Treat}' b~. the Danes on the credibility. of the
FF~D~I band. One week before the Frcnch refPrendum on September 20, there was an increase
~~in rhv reali~nment prubabilit}'. Th~~ turbuleur p~~rio~l afrer~~'arcls ~cirh rlecaluatious of rho peseta
anrl the i~scu~lu. twd the susprnsions uf rh~~ ECi~ liuk~ b~ S~cecleu auel `or~car. e,rneraro~l lirrle losti
of ~~reclibitin- for the French Frauc. e~ccpr iu Di~ceurber 199'?. Lr 1993. realignmrnt probnbilitios
are close to zero. eonsistenr ~cirlr rhe credibilin of the FF!D~I rarget zoue. Tlris coiuci~lr~s n'itlr
a period iu ~~liich French short anQ long-term inrerest ~iffereutials ~'irtuall~~ comrrgerl ro Germau
le~~els, aucl some market ohser~'ers talked abour rhe "franchor", the French Frauc replacing thi~ D~(
in the anchor rol~~ of the E~IS. There is a marke~ incr~~ase iu the realignment probabilit~. iu rhr
~coek of Julv 23. 1993. ~~'hich is large b~' historical standarrls. This is the ~tieek prior ro the An~nst
2, crisis when the parit}~ ban~ls ~~-ere ~~~i~eneil to 15ii on eifhe~r sicle of the central rate. Hencr, our
mo~lel ~ti'ould hace prorlucecl a useful ~ti~arning signal of the rrouble aheacl.
In srmnnarv, we find that 1992 was not a"turbulent" }-ear, relative to historical a~~erage~s. This
ma~- in~eecl mean, as Rose and S~'ensson (1993) argue, that "the currenc~- crisis ma~- hace been
causeel by pheuomena uithout lon~ gestation lags of the s-ort that characterizc most rnacroecunomic
anrl political events."
One structural change does nor arffer from a peso problem and can bP formally- testecl. The
Basle-Nyborg Agreement of September 1987 intemlecl tu strengthen the ER`I by provirling for
intra-marginal intervPntion ancl more liberal short-term hnancing of inter~~entions. This agreemenr
ma~~ affect the wa~~ intra-marginal intenrntion is conducted, putenriall~~ affecting the re~-ersion of
exchange rates towarcls the center of the bancl. ~Ve formall}~ test this b~. allowing t.he conclitional
mean paramet.rrs, ,3~ and (3g, to take rlifferent ealues before an~l after t.he agreement. Neither of
these extra parameters is indiciduall~~ significant and the LRT of t.freir ,joint significance, whiclt is
~2 umler the null. is 0.5986 which is not significant at ant- usual le~'el. ~Ve conclurle frorn this that.
the Basle-ticborg Agreement merely formalize~l the practice of intramarginal inter~-ention ~t'hich
was alreach- common in tlie E~IS.
'~56 Implied Foreign Exchange Risk Premia
S~~ensson (1992a) argues that the fureign czchan~c cisk pr~,utiimt in a tar~ct zone is small- His
anal~'sis is basecl at a simple optimizing moefel ~~~ith ezchangr rate uucrrtaínt~' arising from eschan~;r.
rate mo~emenrs insi~le thE~ ban~l and occasional reali~muents w.hich follow a Poisson process. He
conclucles that risk premia arisin~ from exchange rate mo~'etnents within a narrot~' bancl, as are
in place in thr ER~I, are insi;nificant w'heteas risk premia arising from cle~'aluation risks ma~ bo
considerably larger but are still relati~eh- small in comparison with the expected rate of elevaluation.
His results are important because tlte~' ha~e motivated a large literature on the computation of
realignment probabilities (see above), w'hich imposes UIRP and i~nores risk premia.
The model developed in this paper provi~es a challenge for these results and the methoclologies
on which thev are based. Since we model the complete conditional dista~ibution of exchange rate
changes, we can compute the implied risk premium on FF investments for German investors as
i~7- i~e - 52E[~Srft~lr]. In annualized percentage rnrnts, the risk premium has a mean of 3.02oh
with a standard deviation of 3.28~ aud a first order autocorrelation coefficient of 0.867. In contrast
to a maximum risk pretnium of 4.5~7o in Svensson's model, the t'isk premium graphed in Figure 10
varies between -3.30P1o and 31.4507~. The risk premium seents to sat.isfy the Svensson bands most
of the time, but. increases substantially in times of speculative crises before realignments. This
suggests that the jump risk cliscussed above is pricetl. Regressions of the risk premium on t.he
variance ratios VRt, and VR2,, which measure the importance of,jump risk, ~-iehl highly significant
positive slope coefficients.12 ~Vhen speculative crises hit, both t.he expected rate of tlevaluation and
the uncertainty about future Pxchange rate movements increase clramaticall~'. However, whereas
S~.ensson (1992b) claims that the resulting increase in the interest differential between French ancl
German deposits is primarih' tlue to the increase in the expected rate of devaluat.ion, we Hncl that
a substantial part of the increase in thc~ interest clifferential reHects currenc~. risk.
Fióure 10 about herP
This clabate pacallels the clebate on the size of the foreign exchange risk premium for ftoaring
26cnrrrucies. Oue interpreration of thr empirical F~~'ielence on UIRP, implies thr esistence of Irir;hl~'
~'arial~lr risk prrmia. For rxatnplr. Brkaert (19rJ51 usrs a~rctur autorrgrr.ssi~e framo~~'ork tu rm-
piricall~' rleri~~e lo~crr bunrnls on the ~.~riabilit~ oF risk prrmia ou cen, pounrl anrl mark in~esnnrnrs
for G.S. in~'estors (ancl all cross-rate inr'estmrnts). Hr finrls thr ~'aríabilir~- of thrse ptrrnia to br
iu thc order of IOS'c. three times as large as our estimate for thP FF~D`f risk prf~miunt. `for~,orer.
thr risk prrmiutn changes sign and is often quitr largr. Although here too it is often claimecl thar
thr risk prernium is snrall (see Frankel, 193S). these claims arr alrr~a}'s moilel-baserl. `Iau~' fiut-
darnetttals simpl~' do not show the reyuirerl variabilit~' to explain the empirical r~'irlence on UIRP
rle~'iations.13 Similarlti', it is not surprising that Svensson's theoretical moclrl fails to ~enerate thr
re~quired variabilit.y. For e~ample, he assumes that the exchange rate colatilit;v within the bancl
onh' ~epenris on the position in the band as in rhe Krugman (1991) motlel. ~Ve ha~'e shuwn above
that colatility within the bantl eshibits markeS GARCH effects and that the drpen~lrnce on thr
bancl is cotttrary to what is predicted by the Krugman morlel.
While in the presence of tmsatisfactor}' theoretical motlels, one tnac bc tempterl to reh- ou
empirical estimates of the risk premium, there are dangers in this approach as well. The reclucerl-
form estimat.ion of the conditional Qistribution of the exchange rate is sub.ject. to small sample
probleuts and t.lte exisl.ence uf pr~;~o prublema tnay generally make it rlifCicult to infer t.he correct.
probahilit,~. distribution acx.uall~' used bv agents from a finite data set. Nevert.heless, our empirical
results and the out-of-sample analysis discus'sed above instill some degree of confidence in our risk
premium estimates. ;~Ioreo~~er, there are few alternative empirical approaches. One promising
alternative approach is to use options data to infer the exchange rate's conditional distribution as
in Campa and Chang (1995).
Our findings ha~'e a number of implications. First, the ~'ariabilit,~. of risk premia within a target
zone is considerably stnaller than empirical estimates of the variability of risk premia for fíoatin~
exchange rates. Seconrl, the risk premia are sizablr-~ anrl shoulrl not be iguorecl. Heuce, t.he practice
in thr~ recent targer zone literature (e.g.. Rose anel S~'ensson, 1993, Chen ancl Giovannini, 1992)
of rel}~ing on UIRP anrl rlisregarding the risk premium ma~' }'ield unreliable empirical estimates of
2ïreali~ument probabilities.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper de~.elops a rich ampirical moclel of exchange rates in a taiger zone aucl applies ir to the
FF~D~1 rate.l~ In contrast to some recent empirical anah-ses, ~ce eletect subskantial non-lineariries
in the behavior of the FF~D~I rate.ts R'e also find rhat, in acldition to rea]ignments of the tar~et
zone itself, exchange rates exhibit a tendenc~- to jump within the target zone. Our model is ablc
to predict. the likelihood and size of these jumps. Furthermore, by modeling the entire conditional
clist.ribution of exchange rates, we are able to isolate the probability of target zone realignments. In
contrast. to previous work, we show that. realignments and the eventual breakdown of the s~ stem are
preclictable an~l that the credibility of the EIVIS clid not. increase after 1987. Ivloreover, the popular
practice of computing realignment probabilities imposing UIRP ignores the potentially important
impact. of large foreign exchange risk premia before realignments.
Our work has implications that, ext.end beyond t.he realm of the ER1S. The recent proposals
to limit the variability of floating exchange rates by means of target zones implicitlv assume that
target zones effectively recluce the ~ariabilit.y of exchange rates, and hence limit t.he costs of exchange
rate uncertainty. Our findings indicate that when a target zone is imperfectly credible, exchange
rate variability can remain substantial because of the presence of jump risk. Moreover, this risk
seems to be priced leading to enormous yield differentials between currencies before a realignment
is expected. Even barring arguments about the true costs of exchange rate uncertainty, it is not
clear to us that. replacing a system of fíoat.ing exchange rates, exhibiting high variability, wit.h a
target zone system, with lower variability on average, but occasional extreme volatility, is welfare-
improving. In particular, risk stemming from a ~.olatile diffusion is much easier to hedge than that.
stemming from a ,jump process, e~r.n if the volatility between .jumps is relatively low.
There exist a number of avenues for future research which could be undertaken to further flesh
out the behavior of exchange rates w-ithin a tatget. zone. First, we ha~-e only considered a bilateral
2So~cltangt~ ratt~ in isolation. ln a s~~stcnt suclt ~ts thr ER~I. nto~cmt'nts in thir~l currr~nrir~s can pttr
pres~urN on tltc~ FF~D`I rarr. Tltat is. rh~~n~ au~ rfff,cri~e. bilatr~ral l~auils ~chicL arF uarro~~rr thrui
thP acrual beutel (set~ PiIL 109~- Flau~lreau. 1tJ01;. au~l S~.rrat. 109G). IInfortunati,h'. ir is likr~f~
ro pro~~~ nuntericall~~ iufF~asible to esrruc! our rechuique~s ro an Pntire s-str'tu of exchatt~c~ rates.
ln rhis sense, the reali~nmenr probabiliríes ~~-o compute ma~- uutlcr-estituatc~ the rrur' reali~nmrnr
probabilities. Seconcl, a bi~~atiare modrl of exchangP rates an~l interest tatf~s coulcl b~~ ~1F~elop~~~
in orcler to esamine UIRP in the context oE our cl~ namic scttin~. In a crcdihlr~ rar;et zono, it is
ptoblemat.ic to rest unbias?ihtr~ss nsing a linear t~e~rF~ssion sinct~ thF intcrest i,liff~~rential is lik~~l~ to
be con~elated ~~-ith the error term. Aloreocer, the possibilitc of infrequent but lar~r~ rcali~nuta~nts
uiakes the E~IS an icleal laboratot,~~ for tht.~ analpsis of peso problems.
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;3:3Footnotes
L Previoits stn~lies focussing on the exchan~e rare clistribution within a taiger zono incln~l~~
Beersma and ~'an cler Ploeg (1993). ChF~n aucl Gio~~annini (1993), Lu;el aud Hakkio (1995).
Flootl. Rose ancl `lathieson (19911. au~l `ieur~lau~l, Verschoor, and R~olff (1991).
2. See Bollersle~-, Cltou. ancl Iíroner (1992) for a re~~iew of v~-idence on ihe presence of GARCH
effects in a ~~arien- of asset prices.
3. Giavazzi ancl Giovannini (1989) discuss rhe e~~idence of intra-mar~,rinal inter~~entions ~cithin
the E~IS. ~ote, howe~er, that the Bunclesbank has ne~.er inter~~eneil intra-nrarginall}..
4. Bertola ancl Caballero (1991) present a srylizecl Iirugman ty-pe muclPl in which the realignment
probabilit,~- depends on the le~~el of reserves. The relationship between the lar~e literature on
spPCUlative attacks on fixed rate systems and tatget zone modPls is explore~ in Flood aml
Garber (1991).
5. For ezample, when a~-1 is allowed t.o depencl on the level of reserves, its coefficient is insignif-
icantly clifferent. from zero an~ of the wrong sign.
6. Note that. this factorization would not be valid if Jt followed a persistent `farko~. process as in
Fngel ancl Hakkio (1995). Gray (1996b) discusses the probletns in constructing the likelihooil
function for regime-switching models with state-dependent transition probabilities.
ï. They may also refíect. the existence of an effecti~~e narrower bound in a multilateral target zone
scstem as in Pill (1994) or the presence of extcrnalit~- effects iu such a multilateral system as
in Flaudreau (1996).
8. Bollerslev (1986) shows that. a GARCH (1,1) process can be wTitten as an .AR~lA(1,1) process
in squared residuals, with autocorrelation parameter ~311 ~-31~~. Whereas the half-life of a shock
is more than 5 years in a standard GARCH (1,1) model, in our model it. is less than 2 weeks.
9. A previous version of this paper, Bekaert. and Gray (1996), provides a sur~.ey of these capital
controls and when they were relaxed.
10. Interestingly, Ireland en~urPd a lOq ~evaluation in January 1993, one month after its capital
controls were~ lifted, despite having st.rong fundamentals. The exit. of the British pound was
a major factor in the pressure on the Irish punt, but it is striking that the devaluation could
no longer be averted once capital controls were lifted.
11. One disadcantage of our framework is that our model ~oes not specifp the full dynamics of
all variables used to predict. exchange rates. Hence, we can onh~ look one week ahead and
cannot sketch the e~'olution of longer-term expectations.
12. Because both the risk premium aml the eariance ratios contain measurement errors that. ma~~
be correlated. this aual~~sis is onl~. sug~esti~.e.
13. See Bekaert (1994) for the anal}.sis of the foreign exchange risk premium in a monetary general
equilibrium model.
S11-1. In Bc'kaf'rt anf] Gra~. (19rJG). ~r'f' aPPI)' a rrro~lihf'~l `.c'rsion of this targFt zonP mocltl to Yhf'
DPUrsclu'rnairk,'L'S Dollar ratc ancl timl uo e~iclc~uct' of rar;;Pr zouf~ bf~ha~'ior.
15 C;ourinchas ( 19~J51 rrarLf's siuiilar ronclffsious ifsing a non-par~anretf~ic insuuruental cariablf's
approaclr.
35Table lA
Tltr tt~n Iar~PSt om~-~~-ef~k dr'ctrascs in rhe Fr,~nch Franc'Dritt.cltt~utntk (FF~D`I) oxchau;;!~ rttt~
(i.r'. apprrciariun oC tlu~ Frztuc) oc~~t rlt~~ p~~tiotl 23 ~Iarcli 10i!) ro 43 Jul~~ 1993. a tor,tl o[ i l!1
ubsHrcari~~u~.
Rank Date Percentage ~V"eeks Since ~~'oeks Until Position
Change Last Realignmeut" Next Realintuneut~' in Bancí'
1 790615 -1.30 13 1~ I] ' 3
2 820205 -1.26 lï í8 -0.3G
3 920918 -1.22 296 O,SG
-1 800321 -1.17 25 SO -0.~S
5 800516 -1.10 33 ï2 -0.05
6 810522 -1.08 86 19 O.S9
7 861205 -0.91 3~ ~~ (1 ' -t
8 810710 -0.80 93 12 Q71
9 83100ï -0-.5ï 28 130 0.0~
10 810626 -0.56 91 1-1 0.6?
a The number of weeks since the last rralignment of Ihr FF~U~( target zone in the Europcan ~lonetaty S~~strm
(E~IS).
" Tlte number oF weeks betwren the current change and the nest. rralignment of the FFIU~I target zone in thr~ [?~IS.
` The position of the FF~D?`I exchange rate within the E~IS target zone before the current change, The difference
between t.he current exchange rate and the center of the band as a proportion of half the w.idth of the band. ~'alues
of -1. 0, and I correspond to exchange ~:1tes at the bottom edge, center, and top edge of the band, respectivel}..
,i6Table IB
TLt~ tr~u Inrqosr ont~-t~~r~e}: inrreasos iu thr' Frt~nch Franc~Deutschcmark (FF~D~I) exchau~e rate
~i.t~. tle,rt~riurion of tho Franc) o~rr rlu~ pt~riotl ?a ~larclt 19~D ro ?3 Jul~ 1993. x tural uf ~-!t)
uL,t~rc~itions.
Rank Date Percent~ge ~Feeks Since ~Veeks Until Position
Cltanhe Last Rr,nlinuntent" Next RealignmentF in Band'
1 820611 ~.61 3'' ~ u~~
2 811002 ~L32 105 0 0.85
p 0.91
3 830318 3.53 3~ 1 0.18
4 86032g 2.60 1r' ,2 0.05
5 83030~ 2.05 3i
~i 13 0.O2
6 820312 1-~~ -0.18
7 871(123 1.(i8 ~6 - 1~ 15 0.09
g ~90G03 1.~5 21 0.36
9 810508 1.d0 8~
1~ 0.91
10 820212 1.29 18
o'I"he. numher o( weeks since the lost realignment of the FF~D~I tar~et zone in the European t`fonetary System
(F.AIS).
' The nunrber of wreks between the cw-rent changc ,wd tli~~ nest realignmcnt oC the FF~D~I target zone iu ihe F~~Iti
` The position o( the FP~Di`1 exchange rate within the F VS target zone before the current change. The difietence
betwer~n the current exchange rate and the center o! the band as a proportion o( half the width of the band. Values
o( -1, 0, and 1 conespond to eschange rates at lhe bottom edge, cen[er, and top edge of the band, respecti~~ely.
3iTable 2
`lo~lrl Sp~~cification.
"Iho couipletr mo~lrl is
JS~I~- T.~"(!~~-i"~i~-i -~7.,-~.~i,-;j ~.p. (1-a~-1)
IC' I ~l - ~- , ~ r;'1 ~,. ~,- : (!~ ~"n;-1 ~. t
~. here
~i-i - ~(Qtti~2SYCr-t)
P~-t - í3af3aLR~-i f;j;~PB,-i~t.3r;ID,-~ f,3;ClD,-~
!1~-t - Qd ~" ~~P6,-i
a?-t - Qto f Qit~l - RD,-1)f~-i f ijtz~i~-i t~3is~PBr-i~,
(IUj
The prccise definitious of the variables used in the moclel are snmmarize~l in Table 3.
T~` indicates a truncated norrnal distribution where tlie underl~"ing norntal clistributiou has coudi-
tional mean ~~-i ancl conditional variance Q~t. 1~-t is the probabilitp of a.jump (Jt - 1) an~l ~(.)
denotes the cumulat.i~~e normal distribution function. RD~ is a reali~nment clun~m}" ~~ariable ~ahich
takes the value one when a realignmenr of t.he target zone occurrecl in ~ceek t ancl zero orhenciso.
3tiTable 3
Drtinitions of thr Variables Usr~l in tllr ~Io~1rI.
Exchan~e R.ate Changes: ~Sr
Cuntiniiuusl~~ compo~uulyd oxclian~e rato chanór' ln ~ ti`' I~ u'lirrr .Sr mpresrnts thr Frrnch Frauc
~ Drur~chrnlark rxclian~r ratr ar tinlc t.
Position In Band: PBr
TLr relari~r positioli oE thr Frrnch Franc~Drurschemark (FF~D~I) ezchan~r ratr ~~ithin tllr Eu-
ropoan ~Ionrtaly S~'stetn (E~IS) tar~et zone banrl: ~-. Sr is the FF~D~I exchangr rare, Cr
,f~ ~-t,)
is the crntrl of t}Ir E~IS target zoue, C'r is tlir ilpper bounclar}' of thr target zonr, anrl Lr is tllr
lo~crr bounclar~' of tllr target zone. -1 G PBr G 1, with PI3r 1 0 if the franc is ill the ~~'rak half oE
thr. banil.
Level of Reserves: LRr
Thr lr~~e~~l of foreign curreuc~~ rrservrs of the Banque dr Francr, relati~'e to a four-~~'eek mo~~ing
~~"'tf5r R'hrn LRr ~ L forei~n currenc~~ resrr~-es ha~~e been deplrted relati~-r l~'rla e:
g 7 ~,-t
Reseroes~- ~
to their rrcrnt a~~era;;r le~rl.
Slope of Yield Curve: SYCr
The slopr of the yielcl curvr for Frellch franc-~lenominatecl instrllments: ~~t2 -~~~'t ~~.here i.Fl' is
the onc-~~ear ratr ancl i~Fl is tho onr-month rate and both ratrs are nnrr„IZaI eurocurre::cy riel~~s.
Culnulative Inflation DifferentiaL CIDr
CPIF C'P7;'
The cumulati~'e inflation differential between France ancl Germam~: c.P - cPt~; CPlq represrnts
the CPI lr~'el ill Fraucr at tbe tilnr of thr last realiglimrllt ofthe French Frane~Deutschrmark tarpet
zone an~ GPI~ represrnts the C'PI lr~~el in France ar timr t. Ttir corrrspondin); trrnls relate to CPI
Ir~~rl in Gen'nanv. This variablr measures the diffrreur~~ brttieeu infíation in France and inflation
iu Grrruam' sincr tbe most recrnt realignment.
Interest. Differelltial: IDr
Thr inrerrst differrntial betw'een Erance and Germam: iFtv - i~tiV- Tklis is t.Ilr clifference brtwrrn
onr-~, erk Enrer~iirrrnry ratrs in France ancl Grrmanp-
3~~Tai~le d
I~Ilximum Likelihood Parameter Estiurates
































































The sample contains wxkly data from 23 ~farch 19i9 to 23 July 1993. a total of 749 oLservations. Model 1
denotes the model in which exchange rate changes are assumed to be conditionally distributed as a truncated normal.
with conditionally normal jumps. Model 2 denotes the model in which etchangr rate changes are assumed to be
conditionally normal, with conditionally normal jumps. '- significant at the Sj level. Alodel 1 is described in
ec{uation (3).
-IUTable 5
Lik~~lihu~,~l rario tr'~ts of rt'sn~icted morlt,ls.
Test Description of Test Restrictiou Degrees of LRT Statistic
Freedom [p-~'alue]
Number








1 U.i 1 l5
[11.39~9j
2 G.aRCH Volatility~








7 Time-Var~~ing Jump Size
antl Probabilin
















Test 1 examines thr significance of the the dependr.nce of the conditional mean on the position in the band in the
absence of jumps. Recall, howevec, from Figure J, that the shape oC the truncated normal distribution itself can drive
mean reversion wit.hin the bands. 'fest Y esaminr's the significance u( G?.RCH effects in the conditional volatility.
1'est 3 examines whet.her the conditional volatility depends on t.he positiun in the band. Test ~t examines the. juint
significance of both sources of conditional heteroskedasticity. Test 5 esamines the joint significance of the conditioning
variables in predicting the jump size. Test. 6 examines the significance of allowing for time variation in the jump
probability. Test 7 jointly examines time ~.zriation in the jump size and probability. Test 8 examinPS the esistrnce of
jumps. For this final test, the LRT statistic is not necessarily dis-tributed as a y2 mtder the null, since t.he jump size
parameters are not identified under the null u( nojumps. Although thc distribution of this LRT statistic reyuites some
adjustment of the Y~, the huge magnitude of the statistic grves confidence m the statistical significance u( jumps.
41Titles~Legends for Figures
Fig 1: French Franc~Deutschemark (FFjD~I) spot rates antl Etu~opean ~lunetar~' S~'stem tar;;et
zonr boiuularic~s: ~larch 19ï3 to Juh' 1993. The elashed liues inilicate realinnmeuts of rhe FP,~D~I
tar;;et zone."
" The dara set consists of weeklv obser~'ations front 23 ~larch 19i3 ro 23 Jul~' 1993. a toral of ï 19
obser~'ations.
Fig 2: This fi~uro contains a time-sPries plor of w'eekh' obser~~ations of the ~ariahles usecl in the
econometric targPt zone mocleL The Log Exchange Rate Change is thr one-week lo~ cliffetc~nce
in the French Franc~Deutschemark (FF~D~I) exchange rate. The Slope of the Yield Curve is
the clifference bPrween the Eurucurrenc} rate on one-~'ear and one-month Franc clenominateel bonds.
The Position in the Band inclicatcs the position of the bilateral rate t'elative to the tar~et zone.
A pusitive value inclicates that the bilateral rate is in the top half of the banel where the Franc has
clepreciated against the !~iark. The Curnulative Inflation Differential measures the cumulati~e
difference behveen infíation in France ancl inHation in Get'mam' behreen rarget zone realiguments.
The Foreign Currency Reserv.es measures French foreign currenc~~ reserves a~ainst a four-week
moving acerage. The Interest Differential is the clifference between the one-month Eurocurrencc
interest rates for Franc and Dlark clenorninateel boncls. The precise definitions of these ~~ariables
are contained in table 2. The elashed lines indicate realignments of the FF~D~I target. zone."
a The data set consists of weekly observations from 23 1~larch 19ï3 to 23 July 1993, a t.otal of 749
observations.
Fig 3: This figure shows the expected change in the French Franc~Deutschemark exchange rate
over the following week - conditional on available information ancl on no .jump occurring - as a
function of the position of the exchange rate within the European 'llonetary S~'stem target zone.
This is a measure of reversion towards the cent.er of the bancl.a
a The data set consists of weekly observations from 23 March 1973 to 23 July 1993, a t.otal of 749
obseraations.
Fig 4: This figure shows the absolute increase in the ,jump probability as a result of a 105~c drop
in the slope of t.he yield curve as a fimction of the initial slope of the yield curve. The paramet.ers
of the .jump probability are estimated using the entire data set."
a The data set. consists of weekly observations from 23 It4arch 1973 to 23 Juh~ 1993, a total of 749
observations.
Fig 5: This figure shows the probabilitity, conditional on available information, of a jump in the
Fre~nch Franc~Deutschemark (FF~D~'I) exchange rate in the following week (at-i). The parameters
of the model of t.he conclitional distribution and the ,jump probabilities are estimated using the entire
data set. The dashed lines indicate realignments of the FF~DI`I target zone.a
a The data set consists of weekly obser~~ations from 23 blarch 1973 to 23 July 1993, a total of ï49
observations.
Fig 6: This figure shows the expected size of a jump in the French Frane~Deutschemark (FF~D~t)
exchange rat.e in the following week, conditional on available information ancl on a,jump occurrin~,
(Pc-I). The parameters of the model oF the conditional distribution and the ,jump means are
estimatecl using the entire clata set. The clashed lines indicate realignments of the FF~D`I target
zoue.
" The clata set consists of weekh~ observatiais from 23 Alarch 1973 t.o 23 July 1993, a total of 7-10
ohser~~ations.
~~Fi~ 7: This fi~itre sltu~cs the scalc~cl r,t~~' elata .,.5~ - ~ti' F„''
~"~ .11? ~,~~, I
ancl srarnlrcrclizocl rosichtaL ~
~c,-F ~s, r,-,'
`' - ~ ~'.-~ lt j~
" Thc~ clata sc,t cunsists of ~~eakl~ ubser~-ations fi~otit 23 ~(arch 1973 to 23 Jnh 19f)3. a total of 7k!)
observatiuns.
Fi~ 8: Tlci, fi~ure sho~~~s the probabilitit~. cunclitional on a~ailablc~ infonuation. thar rlce Ftrnc9t
Frattr~Deurschvmark (FF~D~I) exchan~e rnro ~~~ill uto~o outsicle the Fnropean ~[onr~tarc S~strw
rar~er zonc, ilctriti~ rhe f~llowin~ ~ceek. Thts cuuclirional proliabilit}~ is runtpure~l l~~~ ittrq~ratitc;;
the area of the conclitional distributiun which is outsicle rhe target zone, ancl is interpretecl as
thr reati~nment probabilih~. The parameters of the mo3e1 of the conditional tlistributiun auel
tha reali~mt'tnnt probahilities are estimate~ usiuK the rutire clata sc'~t. The ila~lted liues inclicare
reali;;umeuts of the FF~D~I target zone."
" Tho clata set. consists of ~ceekl~. observatiotts from 23 ~larch 1973 to 23 July 1993, a total of 749
ubservarions.
Fig ~J: This hgure shows rlte probabilitit,v. conelitional on a~ailable infortustion, thar the Freuch
Pranc~Deutschemark (PF~D~I) eschange ratr will mo~-e outsicle the European :~Ionetary- Svstem
tatget zono cluring the followint; week. This conclitiottal probabilitv is computed b~. integratinl;
tha area of the condirional clistriburion which is outside the target zone. ancl is interpretecl as the
realit;nment probabilit,c. Li computin~ the realignment probabilit;v at time t, the parameters of the
moclol of the conclirional Qistribution are estimatecl usiiig clata up tu time t- 1 ottl~. The dtuhecl
linc~s in~lir~te rertlignments of the FF~D~t target zone."
" The clata sot consists of weekh~ observations from 23 ~Iarch 1~73 tu 23 Jctly 1993, a total of 740
observations.
Fig 10: Tltis figure shuws the impliPd risk prc~tnium for the Fre~nch Franc~Deutschemark (FF~D`Ij
exchant;e rate. This is computeel as the differrnce between the iuterest~ differential aucl tlte expectecl
eschan;e rate change, aud is reportrcl in anmtaliteil percentage terms. The parameters of thc~ model
of the couclitional distribution and the .jtunp means are estimated using the entire data set. The
3ashc~cl lim~s itt~licate realignments of the FF~DbI target zoue.~
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